Mahmood Khataei; Seyed Hadi Mousavi Nik
Volume 12, Issue 37 , February 2009, , Pages 1-19
Mahmood Khataei; Sepideh Khatibi; Nierehsadat Gharshi
Volume 9, Issue 30 , April 2007, , Pages 77-92
Abstract
In this paper, we study the restricting factors leading to the disequilibrium condition in the Iranian market for bank’s credit using the switching regression model for the period 1353-1383 (1974-2004).
The results of our study show that the real banking interest rate, real ...
Read More
In this paper, we study the restricting factors leading to the disequilibrium condition in the Iranian market for bank’s credit using the switching regression model for the period 1353-1383 (1974-2004).
The results of our study show that the real banking interest rate, real money supply, real banks reserves in central bank, and monetary base have significant relationship with credit supply. Also, the estimation of credit demand shows a positive relationship between the lag of the real deposits and credit demand.
The interesting point is the insignificant relationship between the credit demand and the banking interest rate in the study period, but a high significant relationship between supply and the banking interest rate . This implies that the restricting factor in the credit market is the supply side which has always been less than the demand. An estimation of the market clearing banking interest rates in comparison with the real observed interest rates in recent years also confirms the result .
Mahmood Khataei; Parvin Eghdami
Volume 7, Issue 25 , February 2006, , Pages 23-46
Abstract
In this paper, using ARDL method, price elasticity of demand for gasoline is estimated for period 1980-2002. The elasticity is forecasted for he period 2003-2015. The results show that there is a negative and weak relation between real price gasoline (RPG) and gasoline demand. If the RPG rises one unit ...
Read More
In this paper, using ARDL method, price elasticity of demand for gasoline is estimated for period 1980-2002. The elasticity is forecasted for he period 2003-2015. The results show that there is a negative and weak relation between real price gasoline (RPG) and gasoline demand. If the RPG rises one unit (200 Rials in nominal price), the gasoline demand would fall 18.5 units (1850 million liters) per year. It seems the reason foe such a low effect is the government polices to keep nominal price of gasoline (NPG) lower than international one. At such a low price, the demand elasticity is very low. In order to forecast the gasoline demand elasticity, three scenarios for NPG rises are considered. The results indicate that, by a 10% annual rise in the NPG, the gasoline demand elasticity would decrease. By a 30% annual rise in the NPG per year, gasoline demand elasticity would increase slowly reaching -0.50 in the last year by forecast. By a 50% annual rise in the NPG per year, gasoline demand elasticity would increase rapidly and it would reach to less than -1.
Mahmood Khataei; Roya Seifipoor
Volume 7, Issue 24 , October 2005, , Pages 53-76
Abstract
In Iran, financial market is heavily dominated by the government. The big share of market is owned and run by government, particularly in banking sector. In effect the range of interest rates for different deposits and loans in banks are fixed by Islamic Republic of Iran Central Bank (IRICB). Since the ...
Read More
In Iran, financial market is heavily dominated by the government. The big share of market is owned and run by government, particularly in banking sector. In effect the range of interest rates for different deposits and loans in banks are fixed by Islamic Republic of Iran Central Bank (IRICB). Since the rates are well below the equilibrium levels, selective credit policies are common components of financial restriction in Iran. In other words credit rationing is implemented in official market. Under such circumstances, a black marker for deposits & loans is formed. It operates with very higher interest rates, but very efficient with respect to decision making process. The two official and non- official (black market) markets form the two – sector financial system of Iran. Each sector is managed with different rules and policies. As a result some well known rules in monetary policy do not work in the expected way in Iran. In particular decreasing interest rate policy in official market does not boost the demand through investment. We show theoretically the subject by a modified version of Loanable Funds Theory for a two – sector financial market. Moreover an estimated Iran investment function confirms empirically the theoretical approach. Engle – Granger Test confirms the results too. Also financial repression in Iran causes some transfer payments by deposit owners to those receive loans in official market which could be as high as over %10 of GDP. The policy implication to be adopted by policy makers is a well known deregulation policy which results in integration of the two markets.
